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Joint Operating Agreement Issues
Patrick W. Gray
Liskow & Lewis
Lafayette, Louisiana

I. Introduction
This talk is technically entitled Joint Operating Agreement Issues. The
title was an attempt by those behindpro
the presentation of this year's Mineral
Law Institute to provide subject matter that was sufficiently broad to allow
the speaker to delve into selected areas covered by standard operating
agreements. Accordingly, we will delve into the various ways operations
are conducted between mineral producers involved in "Joint Exploration
Activities." Joint Exploration Activities according to &Williams Meyers
are:
A term used "to describe the situation of ajointly owned lease or block
of acreage which contemplates the exploration and drilling of multiple
wells, each party paying for its own costs and being entitled to its
rata share of income and operating expenses. Thisjointform ofoil and
gas activity is primarilyconducted via theform ofa joint operating
agreement'.. ." [Emphasis added.]

8 Williams & Meyers, p. 540.
which correctly point out, because of the risk involved, these
As the authors
activities are generally conducted under the auspices of a joint operating
agreement. When they are not, it is often the result ofa failure of the parties
to agree on one because of competition in the area or some other like
reason. We will later address&the problems that might arise because of the
failure to enter into a joint exploration or operating agreement.
Joint Operating Agreement is defined as follows:
An agreement between or among interested parties for the operation of
a tract or leasehold for oil, gas and other minerals. This type of
agreement is frequently entered into before there has been any
development. Typically the agreement provides for the development
of the premises by one of the parties for the joint account. The parties
to the agreement share in the expenses of the operations and in the
proceeds of development, but the agreementnormally is not intended
to affect the ownership of the minerals or the rights to produce, in
respects, among others,thejoint operatingagreementis to be
distinguishedfrom a unitization agreement and from a mining
partnership.A joint operation may be carried on by a variety of means
other than by a joint operating agreement, including the following:
joint adventure, partnership, corporation or trust. [Emphasis added.]
8 Williams Meyers, p. 541.
As indicated, the result of ajoint operating agreement is the creation of
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a joint account that constitutes the funds available for the payment of
obligations and that is amassed by the collection of money both by
contributions from the parties and through the collection of proceeds from
production in those cases where the operator does marketing. Note that
under the agreement referenced by Williams & Meyers, lease ownership
remains separate.
Operations to conduct exploration for minerals are often conducted
under a written form ofjoint operating agreement developed for onshore
operations by the American Association of Petroleum Landmen, (latest
revision being Form 610-1989). In Louisiana, such an agreement must be
in writing because it deals with the operation of mineral leases. Hayes v.
Muller,245 La. 356, 158 So.2d 191 (1963). Thejoint operating agreement
is designed to set forth the rules under which the property will be developed
and how the parties will share income going forward in the venture.
Inasmuch as there are legal relationships that would naturally cause certain
duties to arise, the content of this agreement is important. This paper will
follow and discuss the format of the current standard form joint operating
agreement and discuss case law affecting particular areas covered by such
agreements.
II. The Joint Operating Agreement
The AAPL Form 610-1989 is designed in a format that covers the
basic necessities of operations and in some instances provides multiple
choice or fill-in the blank options that create elections to accommodate
specific needs or preferences.
A. Article I - "Definitions"

The first section of the standard form operating agreement defines
certain terms that are used and applied in the agreement. While seemingly
terms are often self-defining to those who are familiar with oil and gas
operations, one should nevertheless pay special attention to these terms and
take pains to apply them consistently in any additions to the agreement as
well as in any other writings dealing with or affecting the area covered by
the agreement. Where necessary, one should also add additional definitions
of terms of art. If a party is ever called upon to ask a court to decide the
meaning of certain provisions of the joint operating agreement, farmout
agreement, or any side letter, the court will pay close attention to how these
terms are defined.
In a lawsuit about oil and gas matters such as these, more times than
not the court will not have any experience with oil and gas matters, and
these terms of art and will mean absolutely nothing to the court except
insofar they are defined in the contract or in normal use. Recognizing these
types of situations, Civil Code article 2047 provides that: "The words of a
contract must be given their generally prevailing meaning. Words of art
and technical terms must be given their technical meaning when the contract
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involves a technical matter." This Code article will likely allow parol
evidence about customary meanings in the industry, which means that a
potential swearing&match may develop among experts as to the meaning of
terms.
To illustrate the point, reference is made to decision by Judge Clement
of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, in
LouisianaLand ExplorationCo. v. Unocal Corporation,863 F. Supp.
306 (1994). There, the court struggled with terms of art used in a mineral
instrument (in this case, a lease). The questions presented were
whether
the term "value" in the royalty section providing that LL&E was to receive
27-1/2 percent of the value of liquid hydrocarbons was ambiguous and
would require parol testimony, including testimony of an industry expert,
and (2) whether the phrase "premiums or allowances" was ambiguous in the
context of whether gathering charge reimbursements would be construed as
allowances. In each case, the lawyers for LL&E argued forcefully that the
terms were clear and unambiguous while the lawyers for Unocal argued that
they were subject to special meaning in the industry which required further
explanation. The court split on the two terms, saying the first was
ambiguous and called for testimony of "professionals in the industry" as to
the meaning of the word "value." However, no testimony was allowed on
the meaning of the phrase "premiums or allowances" as section 110 of the
NGPA, which allowed the gathering charge reimbursement, characterized
the charge as an "allowance." Thus, in this instance, the court was able to
locate a statutory definition. The sum and substance is that the courts, who
do not deal with these concepts on a day-to-day basis, will not naturally
adopt assumed industry definitions.
Even terms which are used that are commonplace and seemingly welldefined in the industry can be made subject to interpretation precisely
because they are specialized industry terms. Ifthe drafter is not careful to
define terms and use them accordingly, an unintended meaning may be
attached to the terminology even where the drafter assumes that the other
contracting parties understand the terminology. For that reason, it is very
important to use consistent terminology in all of the documents that both
lead up to and more particularly, are employed in subsequent agreements,
because conflicting definitions in earlier or later documents can be used to
modify or define the rights and obligations of the agreement. Likewise,
where appropriate the drafter should always take the trouble to fully define
specialized industry terminology.
B. Article II - "Exhibits"
The "Exhibits" section of the joint operating agreement calls for
supplementation of the main body of the agreement with those exhibits
frequently attached to the agreement. Certain of the proposed attachments
are commonly used and are significant. Those familiar with these
agreements know that Exhibit "A" is in many ways more important than
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any provision in the body of the agreement. Exhibit "A" will define the
lands and leases that are subject to the agreement, the percentage of
ownership before and after payout of the participants, and other burdens
that might exist against the leases covered by the agreement. In conjunction
with Article III ofthe Joint Operating Agreement, Exhibit "A" will define
the basis upon which expenses will be charged and revenues will be
disbursed. Obviously, errors in Exhibit "A" could have drastic implications
in the event that a third party was to rely upon the recorded agreement or an
extract of the agreement.'
Exhibit "C" is styled "Accounting Procedure" and will generally
contain the currently effective procedures developed by the Counsel of
Petroleum Accountants Societies ("COPAS"), which will define how and
when the charges to the joint account can be made as well as how and upon
what basis credits will be given. Exhibit "E",Gas Balancing Agreement, is
an optional attachment. There has been quite a bit if controversy
throughout the industry about gas balancing in recent years (discussed
briefly below). The gas balancing agreement is an optional attachment, but
it is sufficiently important that the Louisiana Supreme Court has made
reference to the fact that the one who does not enter into a gas balancing
agreement either in connection with the joint operating agreement or
otherwise does so at his or her own peril.2

C. Article III - "Interest of the Parties"
Article III, "Interest of the Parties", contains three sub-sections.
Section III(A), "Oil and Gas Interests," deals with the situation in which one
of the participants in the joint operating agreement also owns a fee interest.
It determines how the fee interest will be treated. This Section is obviously
of limited importance.
By contract, Section III(B) is almost universally important. It is an
adjunct to Exhibit "A" of the joint operating agreement and it essentially
establishes that the costs and liabilities incurred in operations under the
operating agreement shall be borne, and all equipment and material shall be
owned, as the parties' interests are set forth in Exhibit "A." Similarly, it
states that all oil and gas production from the contract area shall be owned
LSA-R.S. 9:2731 etseq. provide that a joint operating agreement will be effective as
1
to third parties and establish a procedure by which third parties may be bound by the
recordation of a declaration in lieu of the filing ofthe entire agreement.
2
In its opinion denying relief to owners seeking cash balancing in lieu of in kind
balancing, the Louisiana Supreme Court declared:
The owners could easily have entered into a gas balancing agreement or inserted a provision
addressing the issue of imbalances in a joint operating agreement. The owners involved in
the instant case failed to do so, despite the existence of case law and commentary which
clearly demonstrates that owners not covered by a joint operating agreement or a gas
balancing agreement proceed at their own peril.
Hunt Oil Co. v. Batchelor,644 So.2d 191 at 204-5 (La. 1994).
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by the parties as their interest is set forth in Exhibit "A." Section III(B) also
has a provision indicating that no party to the operating agreement shall
ever be responsible on a price basis to any other party's lessor or royalty
owner for a price higher than the price received by that party. In other
words, if the price for products sold under the operating agreement is below
what is owed under the mineral lease, then the party who contributed the
mineraloralease to the joint operations shall bear the additional royalty.
Finally, this section states that the method ofjointly operating these mineral
interests does not establish a cross-conveyance of the mineral leases
covered by the agreement. Rather, the parties continue with their separate
ownership rights and obligations. The net effect of this is that if there is
going of
to be joint ownership of the leases under the agreement, that will
occur by virtue of ancillary agreements such as farmouts, subleases,
assignments.
Section III(C) of the operating agreement simply establishes that if
party creates additional burdens against a lease that has been contributed to
the joint operating agreement, that party shall bear the additional burdens.
The other parties are not responsible for it. It further establishes that any
subsequently created interests shall be subject to those operators and nonoperators' liens, which are established in Article VII of the joint operating
agreement. Obviously, this would only be effective to the extent that one
has properly recorded the joint operating agreement or a memorandum
operating agreement, which would put third parties who receive the
subsequently created interest on notice of the agreements, restrictions,
obligations and lien provisions.
D. Article IV - "Titles"

Article IV deals with "Titles." Section IV(A) is the "Title
examination" provision: "Title examination shall be made on the Drillsite
of any proposed well prior to commencement ofdrilling operations and in
the event the Drilling Parties so request
a
or Operator so elects, title
examination shall be made on the entire Drilling Unit, or maximum
anticipated Drilling Unit, of the well." Title examination is therefore
mandatory for the drillsite on any well, and it is mandatory on the entire
unit where a party requests it. Inasmuch as this is a mandatory provision, in
the event that the operator fails to obtain title examination, and
if title proves
defective, the failure to obtain a title examination could conceivably
constitute gross negligence on the part of the operator under Article V and
cause the operator to be liable for the loss of the interest that could have
been corrected by title curative work. Additionally, this failure could
constitute a violation ofthe agreement and might make the operator liable
for breach of contract even the loss were not deemed to be the result of
gross negligence.
These mandatory provisions provide serious legal responsibility
questions that have not yet been resolved by the courts. This paper will
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discuss below the problems courts have had in applying the gross
negligence standard to the actions ofthe operator in particular contexts, and
those discussions will apply to each situation in which the operator is given
a mandatory directive such as this one. In the author's view, the Article V
(2) the operating
standard should be applied to all activities conducted under
agreement by the operator such that the court should be compelled to find a
breach ofthe agreement, and then find it to be as a result gross negligence
or willful misconduct before awarding damages, but this has not always
been done.
(1)
Section IV(A) further states that: "No well shall be drilled on the
Contract Area until after
the title to the Drillsite or Drilling Unit,
appropriate, has been examined as above provided, and the title has been
approved by the examining attorney or title has been accepted by all of the
Drilling Parties in such well." Again, this is mandatory. An operator needs
approved title opinions or waivers on the drillsite (and potentially the entire
unit) before any well is drilled. This could present a serious problem
drilling operations are begun before the title opinion and curative work are
complete.
Section IV(B) deals with "Loss or Failure of Title." It is fairly
comprehensive and provides that each party bears the burden ofloss ofany
lease contributed by that party. Section VII(E) of the operating agreement,
which calls for the party who contributed the leases to pay rentals, dovetails
with this provision, so that the contributing party will protect that party's
own leases. Often the operator will undertake to cure title, maintain leases
and pay royalties, thereby confusing the respective duties of the parties.
Any loss oftitle caused by the operator would presumably place the parties
proportionately at risk, subject to whatever rights might be available against
the operator under Article V.'
3
In Huggs, Inc. v. LPCEnergy,Inc., 889 F.2d...649 (5th Cir. 1989), the Fifth Circuit,
7
applying Louisiana law, was faced with a situation in which LPC, an
Judge John Duhe,
operator, failed to pay delay rentals and lost two leases and let two others within a unit

expire because they ceased producing and lapsed without an attempt either to maintain them
by further operations, delay rentals, or assignment to the other participants, who would then
be in a position to maintain the leases. The court found that the leases lost because of the
failure to pay delay rentals did not warrant compensation because the applicable agreements
excused the operator from liability from mistake or oversight in connection with the
payment of delay rentals. However, with respect to those leases lost because they were not
maintained by drilling operations or delay rentals, and were not assigned, the court found
that the operator had committed gross negligence, had violated the duty expected of a
prudent operator and as respects a third party overriding royalty owner committed a tort.
There is no mention of the fact that gross negligence was stipulated as a standard in this case
nor does it appear that a funding of such was either necessary or outcome determinative.
Such a finding would certainly not be justify under the definition of gross negligence
the want of that
i.e., "the want of even slight care
established by the
diligence which even careless men are accustomed to exercise." State v. Vinzant, So.2d
Corp. v. HiberniaNat. Bank ofNew
917, 200 La. 301 (La. 1942); First
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Section IV(B) provides that in the event of loss ofa lease there will be
no retroactive adjustment development costs nor operating expenses nor of
revenues. However, where the contributing party has paid up drilling costs
in a producing well there will be a reimbursement of those costs from
in
production. There are V
also
provisions
establishing
that
if
a
contributing
E
party or anyone acting on behalf of a contributing party acquires a lease
interest within ninety (90) days of loss, the acquisition is attributed to the
initial contributing party. This again dovetails with Section of VII of the
operating agreement, which addresses the effect of the lost acreage on the
contributing party or the joint account.
E. Article
"Designation and Responsibilities of Operator"
Article V of the operating agreement is the article that establishes the
rights and duties of the operator. Section talks about designation and
responsibility of the operator, requires that the parties name the operator,
and states that the operator shall "conduct and direct and have full control of
all operations on the Contract Area as permitted and required by, and within
the limits ofthis agreement." It also provides that the operator shall be an
independent contractor, that the operator will not be or hold itself out as
"agent" ofnon-operators, and that the operator "shall not have the authority
to bind" the non-operators "to any obligation or liability assumed
incurred by Operator as to any third party." It further states that the
operator must conduct its activities in a reasonably prudent manner
accordance with good oilfield practice and in compliance with applicable
law and regulation, but goes on to provide that "in no event shall [the
operator] have any liability as operator to the otherpartiesfor losses
sustainedor liabilities incurred except such as may result from gross
negligenceor willful misconduct." Article III of the operating agreement

provides that the costs and liabilities under the operating agreement will be
shared by the parties in accordance with their percentages. Thus, "losses
sustained" here would seem to include all costs and liabilities expended for
the joint account and would thereby subject all of the joint account
expenditures to the gross negligence/willful misconduct standard.
Similarly, the reference to "liabilities incurred" would have the same effect
with respect to third-party liability, whether it be in tort or contract, for so
long as it relates to joint operations.
There is a spectrum of standards of care which, if applied properly,
should provide the rules by which one's conduct will be judged. The least
burdensome to the actor is gross negligence or willful misconduct which
properly applied, are practically equivalent. Gross negligence is defined as
"the want of even slight care and diligence, it is the want of that diligence

Orleans, 891 F. Supp. 290, amended 896 F. Supp. 634 (E.D. La. 1995) aff'd, 5 F. 3d 622
(5th Cir. 1996).
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which even careless people are accustomed to exercising." Alternatively, it
is defined as fault which proceeds from inexcusable neglect or ignorance byis
Louisiana Civil Code article 3506(13). Next is normal negligence which isa
conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the protection
of others against an "unreasonable risk of harm."' Next would be
fiduciary duty, pursuant to which one owes the highest degree of care and
cannot place one's own interest above that of the party to whom the duty
owed.6 While one might anticipate that problems might occur around the
edges of those standards, the courts have had the most trouble determining
when to apply which standard, even in view of the stipulation stating that
the operator will be liable only for those losses sustained by gross fault.'
The appropriate standard for judging the operator's conduct -- gross
negligence -- has sometimes been blurred as courts look to the relationship
a
formed by the joint operating agreement.
Fiduciary Duties and Third-Party Contractual Liability
There has been quite a lot of litigation over the issue of whether the
joint operating agreement confers partnership orjoint venture status.' Ifthe
assignment asserted is a partnership orjoint venture, the participants may
owe each other heightened standards ofconduct, i.e. fiduciary obligations.
Louisiana Civil Code article 2801 defines partnership as follows:
Art. 2801. Partnership; definition.
A
partnership is ajuridical person, distinct from its partners, created by
contract between two or more persons to combine their efforts
resources in determined proportions and to collaborate at mutual risk
for their common profit or commercial benefit.
Trustees and succession representatives, in their capacities as such, and
unincorporated associations may be partners.
Louisiana Civil Code article 2809 provides:
4 State v. Vinzant, 7 So.2d 917, 200 La. 301 (La. 1942); First Commonwealth Corp. v.
Hibernia Nat. Bank ofNew Orleans, 891 F. Supp. 290, amended
F. Supp. 634 (E.D. La.
in 896 5,
1995) aff'd,
5 5 F. 3d 622 (5th Cir. 1996), Huggs, Inc. v. LPC Energy, Inc., 889 F.2d 649 (5th
Cir. 1989).
Gross v. Exxon Corp., 885 F. Supp. 899 (M.D. La. 1994).
6 Grand Isle Campsites, Inc. v. Cheek, 262 La.

262 So.2d 350 (1972).
7
Louisiana Civil Code article 2004 provides, in part, that: "any clause is null that,
advance, excludes or limits the liability ofone party for intentional or gross fault that causes
damage to the other party." This clause does not contradict the stipulation that limits
liability for either slight fault or normal negligence, and this the limitation of liability for
those losses caused by anything other than gross negligence or willful misconduct should be
applied globally to those acts governed by the operating agreement.
Joint ventures are generally governed by the same rules as a partnership. Cajun Elec.
Power Coop., Inc. v. McNamara, 452 So.2d 212 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984). The difference
that the joint venture is generally for a limited duration or purpose. Riddle v. Simmons, 589
So.2d 89 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 592 So.2d 1316 (1992).
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Art. 2809. Fiduciary duty; activities prejudicial to the partnership.
A partner owes a fiduciary duty to the partnership and to his partners.
He may not conduct any activity, for himself or on behalf of a third
person, that is contrary to his fiduciary duty and is prejudicial to the
partnership. If he does so, he must account to the partnership and to
his partners for the resulting profits.
Louisiana Civil Code articles 2814-2816 read as follows:
Art. 2814. Partner as mandatary of the partnership.
A partner is a mandatary of the partnership for all matters in the
ordinary course of its business other than the alienation, lease, or
encumbrance of its immovables. A provision that a partner is not a
mandatary does not affect third persons who in good faith transact
business with the partner. Except as provided in the articles of
partnership, any person authorized to execute a mortgage or security
agreement on behalf of a partnership shall, for purposes of executory
process, have authority to execute a confession of judgment in the act
of mortgage or security agreement without execution of the articles of
in
partnership by authentic act.
Art. 2815. Effect of loss stipulation on third persons.
A provision that a partner shall not participate in losses does not affect
third persons.
Art. 2816. Contract by partner in his own name; effect on the
partnership.
An obligation contracted for the partnership by a partner in his own
name binds the partnership if the partnership benefits by the
transaction or the transaction involves matters in the ordinary course of
its business. If the partnership is so bound, it can enforce the contract
in its own name.
As can be seen, the significance of the partnership or joint venture
finding is that partners or joint venturers are fiduciaries who owe one
another the highest degree of care in the transaction of the affairs of the
entity. GrandIsle Campsites, Inc. v. Cheek, 262 La. 5, 262 So.2d 350
(1972). Inasmuch as the entity seems to fit the classical definition of
partnership, litigation has arisen involving both third party liability and the
liability of the partners interse. Historically, under the case law the courts
looked at the nature of the venture and identified it as what it appeared to
be, and in doing so, often ignored self-serving language in the document
trying to negate the existence of a partnership. Joint operating agreements
have typically contained language to the effect that they are not to be
construed as creating partnerships or joint venturers. As demonstrated
the decisions discussed below, joint operating agreement participants are
generally at arms' length, do not require special protection, and thus the
courts will not be inclined to find those fiduciary duties generally arising
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from partnership or joint venturer status. In a Colorado case styled Dime
Box Petroleum Corp. v. LouisianaLand andExplorationCo., 717 F. Supp.

717 (D. Co. 1989); aff'd938 F.2d 1144 (10th Cir. 1991), Dime Box, a nonoperator, claimed that LL&E, the operator, owed a fiduciary duty and was
liable because it obtained some purchasing advantages that it did not share
with the venture. The court found that this was an area in which a fiduciary
relationship could conceivably be imposed, but because the parties were
both sophisticated and of equal bargaining rank, because the operating
agreement had disavowed a joint undertaking, and because the parties had
specifically stated that the measure ofoperator's liability would be "gross
negligence or willful misconduct," the court found there was no joint
venture and no fiduciary relationship.
In Caddo Oil Co., Inc. v. O'Brien, 908 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1990),

O'Brien claimed that Caddo, as operator, owed a fiduciary duty and an
accounting. The accounting obligation would effectively have shifted the
burden from O'Brien to disprove the correctness of operating charges, to
Caddo, who would have to account for and justify all charges. The court
held:
O'Brien is incorrect. Caddo was under no duty to provide O'Brien
with an accounting. Rather, the onus was on O'Brien to conduct an
audit if he believed one necessary. Under the terms of the Operating
Agreement, the Operator is liable to the Owners only in cases of the
Operator's willful misconduct. The terms ofthe Operating Agreement
control, and Caddo's actions are to be judged by a prudent operator
standard, not by that of a fiduciary.
Id.at 17. It seems clear that the operation of the agreement is such that the
parties will act at arms' length, and the duty will be that set forth in the
operating agreement, not the more stringent duty owed by a fiduciary.
The other aspect of a finding ofpartnership or joint venture status, is
as partners
v.
that such a finding would call for liability of the non-operators
or joint venturers for obligations contracted by the operator. In this area,
the courts have been more inclined to ignore self-serving stipulations and
analyze the venture based upon how it is structured rather than what the
parties choose to call it.' Thus, in Posey v. Fargo, 187 La. 122, 174 So.
175 (La. 1937); Duncan Gill, 227 So.2d 376 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969),
cert.denied,255 La. 338, 230 So.2d 834 and cert. denied,397 U.S. 1074,
25 L. Ed. 2d 809 (1970); and Young v. Reed, 192 So. 780 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1939), the courts have held that joint oil and gas operations constituted
joint venture causing liability of all participants to third parties. It follows
that an agreement to jointly operate leases could be construed as a joint
venture or partnership under these principles of Louisiana law, creating
joint liability to third persons in spite of the stipulation to the contrary
9

Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. McNamara, 452 So.2d at 212.
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contained in the operating agreement.
Fortunately, this problem has been obviated by the enactment of
Mineral Code article 215, which provides:
A written contract for the joint exploration, development, or operation
of mineral rights does not create a partnership unless the contract
expressly so provides.
There is no case law applying the article, but it obviously specifically
addresses the joint operating agreement situation and negates the existence
of a partnership (or joint venture), absent a specific declaration creating the
partnership.
A related avenue for liability to third-parties would seem to be via
mandate or apparent authority. The model joint operating agreement
contains a specific disclaimer as to the ability of the operator to act as agent
for the non-operators. However, Louisiana Civil Code article 2814 states
that: "A provision that a partner is not a mandatary does not affect third
persons who in good faith transact business with the partner." It would
appear that the agreement, specifically denying the existence of agency, if
properly recorded, would take care of both the mandate and apparent
authority issues both by virtue of the provisions of Mineral Code article
215, negating partnership, and the "good faith" requirement of article 2814,
because good faith could not be argued in view of the existence of a
properly recorded joint operating agreement. The reason that these
provisions are important is that in the event of insolvency of the operator,
there will often be an attempt to hold the non-operators liable for the debts
contracted by the operator. It would appear that absent an affirmative act on
the part of the non-operator which would suggest responsibility, the nonoperators should not be personally liable for those debts.
For the same reasons as it serves to protect against third party
liabilities, Mineral Code article 215 should also prevent those fiduciary
obligation claims between the participants that have arisen from time to
time in Louisiana, which we discussed earlier and which have been
successful in other states. See e.g., TXO v. Hawkins Oil & Gas, Inc., 668

S.W.2d 16 (Ark. 1984).
The Stipulated Gross-Negligence Standard
At law, the naturally applying standardwould be normal negligence,

but the gross negligence stipulation, if effective, would change the standard.
By implication, Louisiana Civil Code article 2004 allows such a change in
the standard. That article provides: "Any clause is null that, in advance,
excludes or limits the liability ofone party for intentional or gross fault that
causes damage to the other party." Article 2004 does not permit absolution
from gross fault, but clearly permits the raising ofthe standard of liability to
gross fault or intentional misconduct.
Massey v. DeccaDrillingCompany,Inc., 647 So.2d 1196 (La. App. 2d
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if

Cir.) writ denied,653 So.2d 563 (1995), addresses the application of Article
2004. There, an operator hired an investors' drilling company to drill an
earning well under a series of farmouts. Massey, the operator, did not like
the progress of the drilling and stopped the well short ofits intended depth,
whereupon a disgruntled employee ofthe driller threw tools and junk down
the hole. The well was cleaned up at a cost of $44,000 and produced about
9,500 barrels of oil, but liens were filed and the well was plugged. A jury
found that the plaintiff had been damaged by the drilling company in the
amount of nineteen million dollars; most of which was lost mineral
production. In order to find that Decca was responsible, the court had to do
two things. First, it had to negate the consequential damages provision of
the drilling contract, and second, it had to find Decca responsible for the
intentional act ofits employee. The court did both. It found that Decca was
vicariously liable for its employee's intentional tort and that the
consequential damages limitation did not apply because of Article 2004.
The case is very troubling from the standpoint ofcontrolling exposure
to the joint account. What would be the result an operator's employee
destroyed equipment? Presumably, this would be one instance in which the
operator would be responsible for those actions and liable to the nonoperators. Outside of the context of this subject matter, the case is as
troubling from the standpoint of proof of what had to be the most
speculative of damages. v.It's inconceivable that a well produced 9,500
barrels of oil before being plugged could be shown to have, more likely
than not, produced minerals valued at over sixteen million dollars to the
farmoutee.
Tort Immunity for Non-Operators
In recent years, personal injury plaintiffs in oilfield cases have
sometimes pursued the non-operating interests. These cases have generally
failed. In those cases arising in the Outer Continental Shelf, courts have
generally held that the joint operating interests constitute a "joint venture"
for purposes of the Longshore and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act (the
"LHWCA"), the compensation scheme that generally governs mineral
operations on the Shelf, and have held that the non-operators, as "joint
venturers," are immune under the LHWCA. See, e.g., Heavin Mobil Oil
ExplorationandProducingSoutheast,Inc., 913 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1990);
Davidson
Corp., 860 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1988). The irony of the
non-operators arguing that they were joint venturers for the purposes ofthe
LHWCA, but could not be held liable as joint venturers otherwise, has been
frequently challenged. However, the federal courts, as in Heavin and
Davidson,have routinely held that despite a stipulation to the effect that no
partnership or joint venture exists, and despite the dictates of LSA-R.S.
31:215, the substance of the relationship and dictates that the operating
agreement creates a joint venture for the purposes of LHWCA. In nonShelf cases, courts have immunized the non-operators under the Louisiana
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worker's compensation law because those non-operators were considered
"statutory employers." See, e.g., Rosskamp v. PhillipsPetroleumCo., 992
F.2d 557, 558-59 (5th Cir. 1993). Recent legislative action may, however,
have partially eroded the statutory employment defense under standard
operating agreements.
In Act 315 of the 1997 session, the legislature limited the statutory
employer defense somewhat. Under the revision, a defendant cannot take
advantage of the "trade, business, or occupation" theory of statutory
employment -- a theory typically relied upon by non-operators

--

"unless

there is a written contract between the principal and a contractor which is
the employee's immediate employer or his statutory employer, which
recognizes the principal as a statutory employer." In other words, to use the
broadest form of the statutory employer defense, the joint operatingof
it
agreement must recognize the non-operators as the statutory employer of
the operator's employees. This may turn out to be a small problem,
however, as the available tort theories against non-operators [e.g. strict
by
liability] have also been limited in recent legislative actions. Nonetheless,
may be wise to include the "statutory employer" declaration in the operating
agreement in order to protect non-operators against suits by the operator's
employees.
Withdrawal and Removal of Operator
Section V(B) provides for the resignation or removal of Operator and
selection of successor. It states that the operator can resign at any time
giving written notice to the non-operators, but it further provides that the
resignation will not be effective for ninety (90) days. The significance of
the timing ofthe withdrawal of an operator was underscored in the case
Lancasterv. PetroleumCorp.ofDelaware,491 So.2d 768 (La. App. 3d Cir.

1986). There, Petroleum was an operator of a well that blew out during
drilling. Petroleum recommended the plugging and abandonment of the
well, and as evidence ofits conviction in its recommendation, resigned and
threatened to plug the well that day unless another operator took over that
day. Lancaster found another operator by agreeing to give the substitute
operator a substantial portion of his back-in interest. The court found that
Petroleum had breached the operating agreement by failing to honor the
ninety (90) day notice of resignation provision"o and awarded damages
based upon the rights that were given up to the entice the new operator into
taking over operations. This case seems to suggest that with a breach ofthe
express provisions of an operating agreement, the gross negligence standard
contained in Article V will not apply.
In addition to the provisions containing the procedure for voluntary
10
Arguably, the withdrawal would have been actionable even absent a specific ninetyday notice provision. See Tabco Exploration,Inc. v. Tadlock Pipe & Equipment,Inc., 617
So.2d 606 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993).
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withdrawal of an operator, Section V(B) also provides the procedure by
which an
'A'operator may be removed by the other non-operators. This
procedure requires (1) good cause;
an affirmative
vote of the non(3)
in
operators who own the majority interest remaining if the operator's interest
is excluded;
delivery of notice of the vote and the written notice ofany
alleged default, and period oftime within
if which to cure the default, either
thirty (30) days or forty-eight (48) hours depending on whether or not the
default concerns operations then being conducted. The operator can then be
removed by vote in the event ofa failure to cure the default. "Good cause,"
as defined in the agreement, means gross negligence,
(2) willful misconduct, or
a material breach of or an inability to meet the standards of good and
workmanlike performance set forth in the agreement. Thus, while the
mechanism for removal of an operator is available, it will be difficult
remove the operator. Assuming, as one must, that the operator will not
agree that it has performed badly or has failed to cure any default
performance, there is no remedy available for removal of the operator
outside oflitigation. Even in the context of litigation, the existence ofthose
required specific notices, non-compliance and proof of valid cause will
constitute formidable obstacles to removing the operator.
In the event ofthe resignation or removal ofan operator, Section V(B)
establishes a procedure to determine how a successor operator will be
selected. The successor operator shall be selected from the parties owning
an interest at the time that the successor operator is selected. The operator
"shall be selected by an affirmative vote of two ormorepartiesowning
a majority interest,as shown in Exhibit A." In this vote, the operator is not
entitled to vote for itself. This clause apparently does not provide a remedy
in the event that less than two parties remain once the operator is excluded.
However, that is apparently covered by the subsequent clause which
provides that the former operator does not vote or votes to reinstate itself,
"the successor operator shall be selected by the affirmative vote ofthe party
or parties owning a majority interest based on ownership as shown
Exhibit
remaining after excluding the voting interest ofthe operator that
was removed or resigned." So, if there are only two parties to an operating
agreement, and one is operator, the remaining party (whether or not
majority interest owner) may vote to appoint itself operator. Similarly, with
multiple parties, those parties may elect an operator even through they do
not own an actual majority interest when the ownership interest of the
operator is considered.
Section V(B) also addresses the rights and duties of the operators, how
the operator is bound to obtain competitive rates, discharge expenses,
protect from liens, and hold the money for the account of non-operators
separate from its own. It also provides that the operator shall provide cost
estimates for operations, shall keep the non-operators advised as to
operations, and shall provide insurance for the joint account. These

a
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provisions, while self-explanatory, are mandatory, and the failure of the
operator to comply can make it liable to the non-operators for errors or nonperformance. See ForestOil Corp. v. SuperiorOil Co., 338 So.2d 758 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1976).

Correlative Duties of the Participants
Finally, Estis v. Monte CarloExploration, Inc., 558 So.2d 341 (La.
App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied,563 So.2d 879 (1990), involved a case in which
the Plaintiff lessor was awarded lease cancellation because the ninety (90)
day drilling clause was not satisfied. The lessee sought to hold the operator
liable. The standard applied by the court was that of a reasonable and
prudent operator. It turns out that the lease expired because the Office of
Conservation would not let the operator sell oil until certain operational
improvements were done. The court found that because the operator was
not provided sufficient funds from the non-operators to perform the
services, the operator could not held responsible for the resulting loss. The
sum and substance here is that the obligations are reciprocal between the
operators and the non-operators.

F. Article VI - "Drilling and Development"
Article VI discusses the initial well under the agreement and the
deadline for drilling. It establishes that the first well is mandatory, then
attempts to cover all of the situations of subsequent operations after the
initial well's completion, reworking, plugging back, other operations, or
well abandonment. It also provides a procedure with respect to subsequent
wells under which may choose to participate or may decline to participate in
operations beyond the drilling of the initial well. (5)
Aif
(1)
Elections
The protocol after the first well is drilled is that any of the parties will
be allowed to propose additional operations, whether it be drilling,
reworking, recompleting or plugging the well. Thereafter, the other
participants are required to elect to participate or not to participate in the
operation within a time frame established by the agreement, which is
generally forty-eight (48) hours ifa rig is on location, and thirty (30) days
not. The failure to respond will constitute an election not to participate.
notice shall be written and shall give the parties with an interest under the
agreement details on the
work to be performed; (2) the location;
the
proposed depth; (4) the objective horizon; and,
the estimated cost of the
operation. This section states that non-consenting parties shall not have to
pay for any part of the operation, but shall have no.interest in the operation
until certain percentages subject to selection by the participants to the
agreement have been paid.
The election clauses raises the question of how detailed the proposal
for subsequent operations must be and how stringent the courts will be
about the process. In this context, a discussion of the case law

-
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illustrative. What the cases generally reveal is that the courts will not honor
form over substance, and that they will treat these procedures as strictly as
the parties do. The first case is J-O'B OperatingCo. v. Newmont Oil Co.,

560 So.2d 852 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert.denied,565 So.2d 449 (1990). The
case involved what appeared to be an operating agreement with Area of
Mutual Interest ("AMI") language that allowed the participants, by election,
to share in leases acquired within the confines of the AMI upon payingJ-a
share of the costs. The agreement affected state lands under lease in
to
Texaco. Newmont had apparently committed at least verbally to both the
State Mineral Board and to Texaco that it would conduct seismic operations
as partial consideration for the sublease from Texaco, and for the State's
deferral of further development on the lease.
Under the operating agreement, the participants, including J-O'B, had
the right to participate in any sublease upon agreement to pay acquisition
costs within 15 days of receipt of notice of the acquisition and its cost.
JNewmont offered the sublease based upon reimbursement ofseismic costs
and other expenses. J-O'B agreed to pay all expenses, other than seismic
costs, which were substantial. Newmont took the position thereafter that
O'B had waived its right to participate and proceeded with its plans to drill
on the farmout acreage. Apparently because ofthe view that J-O'B did not
participate in the acreage, J-O'B was not offered an election to participate
the well.
Trial was held after the well was drilled, and the trial court held that
O'B was entitled to participate in the well, but because the seismic work
was a part ofthe acquisition cost, J-O'B had to pay its share. The court of
appeal reversed, holding that the agreement did not allow an electing party
"the right to contest the necessity for or the extent ofany consideration paid
by the acquirer for a lease .... Newmont had no obligation to structure the

agreement so as to satisfy any AMI party, its only obligation being to offer
participation on the terms finally agreed upon." Id.at 859. The court went
further:
Although unnecessary to our decision, we consider that an obvious
inequity would result were we to decide otherwise. As a result of the
equivocal responses from appellees . . . Newmont, together with the

AMI parties who agreed to bear the acquisition cost ... shouldered the
entire burden ... Appellees who bore neither the expense nor the risk
of the venture now seek to participate in the proceeds from a highly
successful well.
Id.at 860. The court was holding the parties to the letter of the agreement
because of its perception of the risk/reward balance that drives the oil
industry, and would not allow an equivocal election to constitute
retroactive acceptance after a successful well had been drilled.
The decision in CrescentDrillingandDevelopment, Inc. v. Sealexco,

Inc., 570 So.2d 151 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990), cert.denied, 575 So.2d 373
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(1991), also illustrates the courts' treatment of election provisions. The
case involved, among other things, a claim that one of the non-operators
had forfeited a mineral interest because it failed to tender a share of drilling
costs. The court made the following observation about how the operator,
Sealexco, managed the joint account:
[T]he record reflects that matters between Sealexco and its operating
partners ... were handled very loosely .... Further the record reflects
that Sealexco, as a matter of practice, allowed its participants to make
elections late, they were allowed to pay prospect fees and other
obligations untimely,....and were never penalized
Ben Seale's
obligation for his share of the cost of the . .. well, although perhaps

tendered untimely, was accepted by Sealexco, utilized and never
returned.
Id.at 155. The obvious implication is that if the provisions of an agreement
are notfollowed strictly, they will not be appliedstrictly by the courts.
The decision in Acadienergy,Inc. v. McCordExploration Company,

596 So.2d 1334 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992), stands in contrast. There the
parties entered into a drilling agreement and an ancillary operating
agreement. Those agreements applied only to acreage unitized around the
initial well drilled under the agreements. After an initial well was drilled by
the operator, Acadienergy, a non-operator, Westover, proposed an
additional well. Acadienergy responded that it did not like the location and
would not participate. McCord then began corresponding with Westover
about revising the well location. They apparently reached agreement and
advised Acadienergy of the fact that they had "refined" the bottom hole
location. Acadienergy requested detail on the "refinement," but the detail
was never provided. In deciding that Acadienergy had not been given a
proper election, and thus did not forfeit its rights to participate in the well
which was already producing, the court noted the following requirements of
a notice of a proposed operation: "As indicated by the terms of the
Operating Agreement, there are five facts of which a party must be given
written notice. These facts are the work to be performed, the location, the
proposed depth, the objective formation, and the estimated cost of
operation." Id.at 1342. Westover argued substantial compliance with these
requirements, but the court of appeal found that because ofthe "refinement"
of the bottom hole location and the refusal of Westover and McCord to
provide information on it, the election provisions of the operating
agreement were not complied with. Thus, Acadienergy was allowed to
participate in the well.
This result is a bit more harsh and less in keeping with the J-O'B
Operatingdecision's deference to the risk/reward equities,. which would
require an affirmative indication ofparticipation in the risk ofthe well prior
to drilling. Perhaps the distinction is that the court was not convinced that
Acadienergy was a potentially willing participant who was not given a fair
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opportunity to participate, whereas J-O'B had been more direct in its refusal
to agree to bear the necessary expenses to participate in the venture.
Spacing
Section VI(B)(7) ofthe AAPL Form 610-1989 provides that "no well
shall be proposed to be drilled or Completed from a Zone in which a well
located elsewhere on a Contract Area is producing, unless such well
conforms to the then existing spacing pattern for such Zone." This is
apparently a provision which is causing great controversy, as it would
appear to prevent an alternate unit well and would prevent application ofthe
consent provisions and non-consent penalties under the agreement.
However, the designation by the Office of Conservation of the well as an
alternate unit well may obviate this problem.
a
Marketing Obligations
Generally, the aoperator is under no obligation to take production and
sell it for the account of the non-operator, but many times does. Several
cases have addressed both the marketing obligation and gas balancing in the
absence of an agreement. In the area of marketing obligations, courts are
willing to honor the terms of the operating agreements insofar as the
agreement might superimpose an obligation that protects the operator from
more stringent liability standards. But the courts, however, are not
consistent on the application ofthose liability standards.
Grace-Cajun Oil Co. No. Two v. Damson Oil Corp., 897 F.2d 1364

(5th Cir. 1990), involved a situation in which Damson acted as operator in
marketing its own and Grace Cajun's gas. The operating agreement
provided that Damson had "no liability as Operator to the other parties for
losses sustained, or liabilities incurred, except such as may result from gross
negligence or from breach ofthe provisions of this agreement." Id at 1366.
Damson sold the gas to Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corporation ("LIG") at
NGPA § 102 price, which it was not entitled to absent the filing and
approval of a well status application with the Louisiana Department of
Natural Resources. Because the well status application was not filed, LIG
recouped the difference between the § 103 price which it paid and the § 109
price that Damson was entitled to in the absence of the application. GraceCajun ultimately sued Damson for its loss. The court did not find
gross negligence or breach of the operating agreement, saying: "It is not
necessary to resolve whether the district court applied an improper standard
to its determination of Damson's liability under the operating agreement.
The gas purchase contract clearly defines Damson's duty." Id. at 1367.
The court was not impressed with Damson's argument that Grace-Cajun
was not a party to the gas sales agreement with LIG, and found Damson
liable for the difference between what was collected and what Grace-Cajun
could have ultimately received had Damson filed for and obtained a well
status determination.
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The court's initial premise here was that under the operating
agreement, Grace Cajun had the right either to market its own gas or to
allow Damson, as operator, to market it. Clearly, this was production
contemplated by the operating agreement and was a central part of that
agreement. It is unfathomable that the court could not conclude that the gas
here was produced and sold subject to the rights, grants and conditions of
that agreement, and for that reason the court's refusal to analyze the
decision under the standards set forth in the operating agreement is
incorrect.
in
In LL&E v. Unocal, 1997 WL 756597 (E.D. La.), LL&E had two
separate relationships with Unocal. At Lake Pagie, LL&E had granted
judgment
several mineral leases to Unocal.
After demand, LL&E sued Unocal to
collect for underpayments of royalties as a result of improper pricing of
liquids, non-payment for reimbursed gathering charges and improper gas
pricing because of certain settlements which Unocal had entered into which
in
reduced the pricing Unocal had received for gas. Unocal counterclaimed
for sums which it had paid to settle an oil pricing claim by the Department
of Energy affecting the Caillou Island Oil Field. Unlike Lake Pagie, at
Caillou Island, Unocal and LL&E were co-working interest owners of
several state leases. The case is interesting and unique because it relates to
a lessee/operator's marketing obligations under two different scenarios -one involving a mineral lease and the other an operating agreement.
With regard to the lease issue, the Court found as had been held
Freyv. Amoco, 603 So.2d 166 (La. 1992), that despite the lessee's duty to
market, the lessee, Unocal, was prudent to renegotiate the gas sales contract
during the gas sales crisis. The court made specific reference to the duty set
forth in the mineral code, i.e. the prudent operator standard under Mineral
Code article 122.
With respect to the joint operating agreement, the court found that the
rights and obligations governing the actions ofthe parties were contained
the two operating agreements at issue, which were identical. The operating
agreements provided that Unocal had "exclusive control" over operations
on the state leases. The agreements further provided that the operator was
"free to exercise its own best
in conducting the operations."
Under those agreements Unocal was to market production in the event that
LL&E failed to do so and would be in full control of those operations. The
issue was whether Unocal should have unitized certain wells in order to
ensure higher pricing under Department of Energy rules in order to establish
that the production could be classified as "new oil" under the regulations
providing higher price incentives for such new oil.
Despite the differing standards in the Grace-Cajun operating
agreement (gross negligence or breach of agreement versus best judgment),
the court found that "Unocal took on the same responsibilities as the
operator in Grace and that the unitizing of the properties in question was
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Unocal's responsibility." LL&E v. Unocal, 1997 WL 756597 (E.D. La.) at
7. The court also found that Unocal chose to ignore the advice on whether
to
in unitize because of concerns that the formation of units would provoke
development demands resulting in the release of non-unitized acreage back
to the State, as lessor. The court found that because Unocal was negligent
of
in not unitizing the properties, it could not collect reimbursement against
LL&E. Stated another way, the court apparently applied a negligence
standard and ignored the "best judgment" standard written into the
agreement.
Well Costs
The next area of discussion relates to operating agreement
responsibilities only indirectly in that it deals with cost adjustments in the
event that operations involving those leases subject to the provisions ofthe
operating agreement are unitized with those not subject to any agreement.
With regard to drilling wells not subject to reimbursement provisions of a
joint operating agreement, problems generally arise when an operator drills
a well into a unitized horizon or into one that is subsequently unitized and
includes acreage not under lease to the joint interests. In those situations
different rules apply depending upon whether or not the acreage is under
in
lease to a third party or not subject to a mineral lease. LSA-R.S. 30:10.
The "Risk Fee Bill" provides a mechanism by which the operator, on behalf
of the joint account, can recover those costs incurred in the "drilling,
testing, completing, equipping, and operating the unit well." The
owner/driller can recover those expenses out of the non-participating
owners share of production, as well as a charge for supervision, plus an
additional "risk charge" of one hundred percent of the drilling and
completion costs.
There is a procedure developed to enable the operator to collect the
risk charge. It requires notice, via certified mail, to others in the unit of the
estimated cost of the well, its location, its proposed depth and logs and other
non-public test data. The recipient of this information is then entitled to
elect to participate that is, the recipient can agree to pay a share of the
drilling cost. In the event that this information is not forwarded
accordance with the statute, the "risk charge" is unavailable. Similarly,
the event that the tract is not subject to a lease, the risk charge is similarly
unavailable, but well costs are properly chargeable, subject to compliance
with the dictates ofLSA-R.S. 103.2 requiring a detailed itemized statement
of the cost of drilling, upon request by registered mail and the passage
ninety days from the formation of the unit.
11
The statute is viewed as punitive and therefore subject to strict construction. On this
basis, it was held in Browning v. Exxon, 848 F. Supp. 1241 (M.D. La. 1994) that because the
statute required certified mail, a notice by registered mail would not suffice. Thus, while the
statute's 15 day response period is stringent, the court's application of it's punitive
provisions is properly lenient.
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The risk fee bill envisions a situation where one is drilling an undrilled
unit or is drilling a substitute unit well, and thus knows the unit
configuration and can ascertain the property ownership and leasehold
situation, and can notify the non-participants. In those occasions in which
the unit is not yet formed at the time that the well is drilled, and is not
formed until after some production has accrued, an adjustment ofwell costs
will be required. In that case, the non-participating owner is given the same
election, with the same results, except that the chargeable costs are "reduced
in the same proportion as the recoverable reserves in the unitized pool have
been recovered by production." This same rule applies to units which are
revised to include extra acreage not under lease to the operator, and the
reverse applies, that is, credits are given to acreage that is excluded from a
unit via a revision of the unit. The method applied effects a change in the
law with respect to the method of achieving such an adjustment.
Desormeaux v. Inexco Oil Co., 298 So.2d 897 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
refused, 302 So.2d 37 (La. 1974), mandated a dollar for dollar method of
reduction ofwell costs. This method was applied recently in the case of Tex
Con Oil andGas Co. v. Batchelor,634 So.2d 902 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993),

cert.denied,635 So.2d 1102 (1994). The "new" method added by Act No.
595 of 1991, has been called the "unit ofproduction depreciated well cost
method." Id. at 907. The former method provided a direct credit for
revenues received for production, while the currently applicable method
requires that the cost of the well be reduced in accordance with its loss of
utility, so as to make the reduction commensurate with the lost value, and
the costs due and owning relate to the future utility and value of the well.

This statute explicitly does not apply to those situations in which written
agreements deal with the same subject matter i.e., operating agreements.
In Acadienergy,Inc. v. McCordExploration Co., supra, the drilling
agreement was accompanied by an operating agreement, which provided for
a set percentage contribution of well costs, subject to a well cost adjustment
based upon voluntary or compulsory unitization affecting the initial well.
The well was included in a Commissioner's unit, which was revised twice.
The question was whether there would be subsequent adjustment upon unit
revisions. The court found that the portion of the agreement providing for

well cost adjustments was ambiguous, and construed it against the drafting
party, Acadienergy. Further, the court found that, equitably, the parties'
revenue interest did not increase with the unit revision, and therefore,
neither should its well cost liability, and thus denied the request for an
adjustment.
Allocation of Production and Balancing
With regard to production attributable to those within the unit who do
not have an agreement with the operator, the applicable law varies
depending upon whether the tract is leased or unleased. Unleased interest
owners are entitled to a share of the proceeds from production attributable
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to the tract's interest in production, for which the operator is liable. LSAR.S. 30:10(A)(3). The working interest owner under a mineral lease is
entitled to receive production. In the event that the working interest owner
does not take production as it is produced, it is now resolved that "in-kind"
balancing is the norm. Hunt Oil Co. v. Batchelor, 644 So.2d 191 (La.
1994). In the event that the well depletes before in-kind balancing can be
done, a cash accounting by the operator is in order. The operator would
then be forced to collect the overpayments to the non-operator caused by
the imbalance. King v. Strohe, 673 So.2d 1329 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996)
suggests that these collection efforts could be governed by the doctrine of
payment of a thing not owed, to the extent that no provision specifically
permits collection from overbalanced parties after depletion.
An under-produced party who has entered into a joint operating
agreement which allows but does not require them to take production inkind, but have not entered into a gas balancing agreement would, according
to the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal, be entitled to a cash
balancing upon depletion. Ellwood Oil Co. v. Anderson, 655 So.2d 694

(La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied,661 So.2d 466 (1995). However, inAmoco
ProductionCo. v. FinaOil & Chemical Co.,
670 So.2d 502 (La. App. I st
Parties"

Cir.) writ denied,673 So.2d 1037 (1996), the First Circuit held that in the
event that the parties had addressed balancing, but did not provide a method
ofcorrecting imbalances upon depletion, there would be no cash balancing.
The 1989 AAPL form contains language similar to that employed in the
Ellwood case and would presumably call for the same result.
G. Article VII "Liability of

Article VII discusses liabilities ofthe parties and what happens in the
event of default by parties. This section establishes that the liabilities shall
be several and not joint or collective and then it restates the notion that
"each party shall be responsible only for its obligations, and shall be liable
only for its proportionate share of the costs ofdeveloping and operating the
Contract Area." It goes on to say:
[N]o party shall have any liability to third parties hereunder to satisfy
the default of any other party in the payment of any expense or
obligation hereunder. It is not the intention of the parties to create, nor
shall this agreement be construed as creating, a mining or other
partnership, joint venture, agency relationship or association, or to
render the parties liable as partners, co-venturers, or principals.
It also conveys that the parties are not fiduciaries with one another and
thus are free to act in their own self interest "subject, however, to the
obligations of the parties to act in good faith in their dealings with each
other with respect to activities hereunder."
Mutual Liens
Section VII(B) is important in that it is the section which iterates the
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liens and security interests purportedly granted by the operating agreement.
In these days ofconstant reorganization and commitment to ever-changing
strategic objectives by the larger companies, parties are called upon to deal
with total strangers under operating agreements created by other parties. It
is not unusual for a company to find itself at odds with another company notin
only in areas of operational philosophy, which creates problems in other
areas, but also in the area of financial responsibility. If the operator has
financial problems, the non-operators may face agency and partnership
claims (previously discussed) as well as lien claims by creditors. As
between the parties, the operators and non-operators liens have becomein
important.
We begin this area with the premise that liens may not be v.
created by
agreement between debtor and creditor unless there is a statute declaring
that such a contract shall create a lien. Blasingamev.Anderson, 108 So.2d
105, 236 La. 505 (La. 1959). Nevertheless, in Kenmore Oil Co. In
Delacroix,316 So.2d 468 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975), the court recognized an
operator's lien, noting that one was provided for in an operating agreement,
but not otherwise defining the source. Since that time, operator's liens have
become commonplace, with little analysis regarding their source. There
have been various suggestions that the operator's lien was created by
subrogation, because the operator paid the bills ofthe suppliers on behalf of
the non-operator, which supplier was entitled to his own lien, or that it was
granted by a broad reading ofthis statute. See Compadres,Inc. Johnson
Oiland Gas Corp., 547 So.2d 382 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989).
Those familiar with the various forms of operating agreements are
aware that the form has always provided for an operator's lien, and many
the more modem forms grant a lien to the non-operator. It does not appear
that any of the arguments advanced in favor of the operator's lien could
even arguably support the non-operator's lien, as it could neither be
supported by the legal subrogation theory nor the "broad language" of the
old lien act.
Fortunately, this problem was rectified by the passage of Act 1040
the 1997 Regular Session of the legislature, which established privileges
favor ofboth the operator and the non-operator. These statutory cross-liens
are contained in LSA-R.S. 9:4881 et seq. Neither lien is dependent upon
the existence of an agreement. This is established by the fact that 4881(2)
defines a non-operator as "a lessee other than the operator," and 4881(3)
defines the operator as "a lessee who is conducting operations with respect
to a well." The fact that these in rem obligations are statute-based and not
dependent upon any agreement raises issues relating to well costs,
marketing and balancing.
The operator, under 4882(A) is granted a privilege "to secure payment
of all obligations incurred in the conduct of operations which the nonoperator is personallybound to pay or reimburse." [Emphasis added.]
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contrast, pursuant to 4882(B), the non-operator is given a privilege "to
secure payment ofall obligations owed to him by the operator from the sale
or other disposition ofhydrocarbons ofthe non-operator produced from the
well." Thus, the operator obtains a lien covering all personal obligations,
while the non-operator's lien only secures payments for production.
Although, arguably, the claim for collection ofthe well costs is quasicontractual,1 2 presumably non-operators who do not provoke unitization are
not "personally bound" to reimburse well and operating costs. " Thus, to
the extent that the non-operator, without an agreement, is not personally
bound, the operator does not obtain a lien on production. However, because
the operator is allowed a direct recoupment from production, the lien may
not be essential for collection ofdrilling or operating costs.
The non-operator's reciprocal lien pertains to amounts "owed" to the
non-operator from sale of hydrocarbons. At first glance, this provision
would seem to strengthen the position ofthe non-operator in a unit who has
no agreement with the operator. However, a closer look reveals that,
because the non-operator is not due anything but an in-kind balancing, and
the act only covers obligations owed, the lien is not granted in an underbalanced situation. After depletion, the non-operator is entitled to a cash
balancing, and LSA-R.S. 9:4883(6) gives the non-operator a lien on the
proceeds received by, and obligations owed to the operator. This remedy
would seem to prove somewhat thin given the narrow time frame that the
"obligations owed" might exist, and the difficulty in tracking the liened
"proceeds." The result that the lien is not as significant, ultimately, as the
personal claim for a cash balancing. These issues point up to the fact that
these reciprocal liens are best suited for application in connection with an
operating agreement that establishes the "personal obligations," which give
rise to the privilege.
The lien granted by Section VII(B) of the operating agreement is
similar to the statutory lien in that it is on the mineral leases, other interests,
and personal property. Unlike the statutory lien, however, this privilege
does not appear to be limited to operations in connection with any particular
well, whereas the statutory lien has historically and is currently based upon
operations on a particular well. It also appears to cover royalty and
overriding royalty interests, which are excluded under the statutory lien. As
a practical matter, however, one might question the wisdom of seizing
royalty proceeds and placing the lease in jeopardy.
The right to collect is based upon LSA-R.S. 30:10 and arguably constitute a "personal"
12
obligation, similar to the operators quasi-contractual obligation to account to unleased
owners. See Taylorv. Woodpecker Corp., 633 So.2d 1308, 1312-3 (La. App. 1stCir. 1994).
13
The non-operating working interest owner is "personally" liable only in the event that
he would "ratify and consent" to the drilling operations per SuperiorOil Co. v. Humble Oil
& Refining Co., 165 So.2d 905 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 246 La. 842, 167 So 2d 668
(1964); Davis Oil Co. v. SteamboatPetroleumCorp., 583 So.2d 1139 (1991).
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Third-party mortgagees ofthe interest owners may claim priority over
the liens in the operating agreement. The lender will claim priority either
because of the public records doctrine or because of the express ranking
provisions of LSA-R.S. 9:4888. A recent decision from the Sixth Circuit,
construing Louisiana law, addressed these issues. See In Re Century
Offshore Management Corp., 119 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 1997). Ina that case,
the lending agreement was made "subject to" the operating agreement. The
court strongly suggested that the mortgage would otherwise have primed
the operating agreement's liens. But by making the mortgage "subject to"
the operating agreement, the lender subordinated its security interest to
those created by the operating agreement, even though the operating
agreement was unrecorded. The result is the same without reliance upon
the "subject to" language. The Fifth Circuit has held that a bank's
otherwise superior mortgage interest and pledge of production must bear
drilling costs attributable to the mortgagor, because the non-operator's
interest was so limited. Grace Cajun Oil Co. No. 3 v. FederalDepositIns.

Corp., 882 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1989). The court's unstated logic, to the
effect that the mortgagee's right to receive production proceeds is limited
by what the mortgagor was entitled to, seems both equitable and rational.
Other Non-Performance Remedies

The operator does have the ability to demand advanced payment for
the next month's expenses from the non-operators in anticipation of
operations under Section VII(C). Thus, the operator does not have to fund

operations for the benefit of the non-operators. This call for an advance
would create an "obligation" under the liens clause, or an obligation
incurred under the lien act and could allow an operator's lien to secure
payment, but the timing is so tight as to make it impractical.
Next, Section VII(D), "Defaults and Remedies," provides remedies in the
event that one of the parties is in default ofits obligations ofthe agreement.
One option afforded the operator is the ability to call upon the other parties
to make up that defaulting party's share, thus reducing the burden upon the
operator. There is a subsection which provides that any party to the
agreement can deliver to a party in default a notice of default and specify
the actions required to cure the default. If not cured within thirty days, then
"all of the rights of the defaulting party granting by this agreement may
upon notice be suspended until default is cured." If the operator is the
defaulting party then the operator who does not cure a default can be
removed by a vote of the non-operators owning a majority interest.
The rights suspended for the defaulting party include the right to

receive information and to participate in operations, even those operations
in which they are currently participating. The suspended rights also include
the right to receive proceeds for production. PittencrieffResources,Inc. v.
FirstlandOffshore ExplorationCo., 942 F. Supp. 271 (E.D. La. 1996) is

case dealing with an offshore platform and purportedly applying Alabama
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law, although it is readily apparent that the choice of law selection was not
outcome determinative. The result would have been the same under
Louisiana law. The case involved an offshore exploration agreement which
was not on a "standard" form, although its provisions, and the problems
created, are not atypical. The operating agreement provided at Section 9.1
that no well that had once produced could be abandoned without the
consent of all parties owning an interest in the platform. Section VI(E)(2)
of the AAPL Model Form 610-1989 has a similar provision. The
agreements also have similar provisions regarding reimbursement for the
abandonment costs net of salvage value. The issue presented revolved
around the fact that Firstland had an desire to take over the platform and
operate it, while Unocal and others wanted it abandoned. The operating
agreement did allow any non-operator an election to take over the platform,
in the event that abandonment was proposed. The concern, unexpressed in
the opinion, was about Firstland's ability to conduct operations in suchofa
manner as to not expose Unocal and other owners to additional exposure in
as
a result of those operations, because Unocal could retain potential liability
as a result ofFirstland's continued operations both to the MMS, as a former
lease owner and operator, and to third parties, under some theory of pretransfer negligence. Section VI(E)(2) of the standard form contains
language to the effect that the party taking over operations shall indemnify
the former owners, but, as is evident, an indemnity is only as strong as the
party providing it. It further provides that the party taking over operations
it
shall prove their ability to a"conduct operations" on the well, but again, the
ability to "conduct operations" may not provide sufficient relief, in that
arguably did not require the demonstration ofan ability to stand the type
losses that can arise due to unforeseen environmental or other catastrophes
which might occur in oilfield operations.
Faced with the prospect ofgiving up its interest in a platform and wells
and possibly retaining exposure, Unocal and several non-operators took the
position that since no non-operator was current on its bills, no non-operator
was entitled to participate in operations or vote. Inasmuch as the exercising
the option to take over the platform and wells required an "election," the
question became whether a party which could not vote, could nevertheless
exercise an election to take over the platform. The court equated electing
with voting and held that party in default could not elect to take over the
platform and wells. The court was initially concerned about the fact that the
loss of voting rights would affect an unintended forfeiture of the parties'
interest in the property. Ultimately, court concluded that the provisions
preventing voting by a defaulted party were intended to limit rights, even
the effect was a forfeiture of property.
It would appear that the limitations on the rights ofa party in default
Pittencrieffaresimilar to the restrictions contained in VIII(D)(1), that is,
party in default cannot receive information, cannot participate in Section
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VI(B) operations, or in the right to receive proceeds. There is no limitation
expressed as to voting on procedures other than those under Section VI(B),
so it is an open question whether the standard form would allow a party in
default to take over operations ofa well after an abandonment proposal. In
any event, one would hope that the Section VI(E) language concerning thea
ability of the defaulting party to "conduct operations" would provide
sufficient
protection.
3
Section VII(D) also contains an interesting provision that states that thea
non-defaulting parties can sue the defaulting parties or operator may sue
joint account expense to collect amounts due, and then provides "[n]othing
herein shall prevent any party from suing any defaulting party to collect
consequential damages accruing to such party as a result of the default."
Part provides that the non-defaulting parties can eliminate the ability of
defaulting party to consent to any future operations. This cures the problem
that had existed in the past under certain operating agreements in which
party might be in default, but might contractually consent to operations and
take the chance of being bailed out by a good well. This basically
hampered the ability of the joint account to continue operating. Section
VII(E) refers to payment of rentals and as discussed earlier, those rentals
and these obligations are taken care of by the party who contributes the
leases although the operator is bound to notify these parties when a rental
might be due or shut-in type rental might be due. In the event the operator
does not do that, the loss is shared by the joint account rather than borne by
the contributing party.
H. Article VIII - "Acquisition Maintenance or Transfer of Interest"

Section A of Article VIII, entitled "Surrender of Leases," provides
that: "the leases covered by this agreement, insofar as they embrace acreage
in the contract area, shall not be surrendered in whole or in part unless all
parties consent thereto." This section then goes on to establish a procedure
of thirty (30) days notice by which parties notify another party of the
potential surrender of leases. When the parties want to surrender, they must
notify other parties, who have an opportunity to pick up those leases. This
section also addresses assignment of the obligations under the leases and
also an assignment of equipment and production. Under the agreement, the
assigning party shall be relieved of further obligations, and the assignee
shall pay the reasonable salvage value ofthe assignor's interest. Of course,
the payment provisions are governed by the accounting procedures that
establishes values. Part B governs renewals and extensions and how they
will be owned.
I. Articles IX-XVI

The remainder of the operating agreement contains Article IX,
"Internal Revenue Code Election." This section enables parties to create
partnership for income tax purposes. Article X talks about how claims and
lawsuits will be handled and gives the operator authority to settle disputes
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up to a specified amount. It provides that the parties shall share an expense
of any claims. Article XI, "Force Majeure," provides what happens if
parties are prevented from operating for any unavoidable reason. Article
XII deals with notices. Article XIII provides for the term ofthe agreement.
Article XIV talks about laws, regulations, what laws will govern, and
allows the parties to select the governing law. Article XV contains
miscellaneous provisions, including how the agreement will bea executed
and its effect on successors and assigns. Article XVI is "Other Provisions"
and allows the parties to create special conditions and provisions.
J. Restrictions on Transfer

Joint operating agreements commonly restrict transfer of interests
covered by the agreement, typically through a preferential rights provision.
in
Yet under a recent decision, FinaOil

and Chemical Co. v. Amoco Prod.

Co., 673 So.2d 668 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1996), cert.denied,679 So.2d 1353
(1996), it may be possible, intentionally or otherwise, to circumvent these
provisions.
In this case, Amoco spun off a number of lease interests to MW, a
newly formed and wholly owned subsidiary, as part of a reorganization.
Amoco then sold all the stock of MW to Apache. Fina, a working interest
owner in the three joint operating agreements involved, took exception, and
sued Amoco. Fina contended that Amoco's action triggered the preferential
right to purchase provisions. The court disagreed. It found that the transfer
from Amoco to MW was part of a legitimate reorganization. Under
standard agreements, where restrictions on transfer do exist, a transfer by
"merger, reorganization, consolidation" is exempt from the preferential
rights provisions. As for the sale of stock by Amoco to Apache, the court
found no restriction in stock transfers in the joint operating agreement.
Accordingly, in effect, Amoco was allowed to transfer all of its interest
the joint operating agreement to another, unrelated party without triggering
the preferential rights provisions.
K. Prescription

Arguably, because billings are rendered periodically on revolving
basis, the charges due under the operating agreement will be governed by
the three year prescriptive period governing open accounts. However, that
is not the case according to the jurisprudence, which holds that the ten (10)
year period governing general contracts is applicable. Caddo v. O'Brien,
908 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1990).
III. Conclusion

There is currently quite a bit more litigation over operating agreements
and co-ownership issues than has historically existed. This trend is likely to
continue given the lack of cohesiveness in the industry. The case law has
indicated that an attempt will be made to honor the language and intent of
those operating agreements, and actually encourages such agreements,
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particularly to resolve theory issues like production allocation. Although
the results of the court's decisions on these agreements are not always easy
to reconcile, the courts will attempt to follow the intent of the parties to an
agreement, and thus it behooves parties to enter into agreements fully
defining rights,and obligations, where possible.
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